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Introduction  
 
The question on how to achieve stability and democracy in states has been widely 
debated in political science. This debate has concentrated on how stability can be 
achieved in states that have heterogeneous populations that are divided both 
politically and by some other characteristic, such as language or ethnicity. While 
many of these deeply divided states are prone to conflict and instability, others have 
maintained democratic regimes that are relatively stable. This discrepancy leads us 
to ask: Why do some deeply divided states achieve stability while others do not? 
This paper examines this question with application to the cases of Vanuatu and Fiji.  
 
Vanuatu and Fiji are small states located in the South Pacific region. Both states 
were formerly under colonial rule and have Melanesian cultural influences. These 
states joined the “third wave” of democracy (Reilly, 2001, p.2) with Fiji gaining 
independence in 1970 and Vanuatu in 1980.  Both states are ethnically diverse and 
had deep cleavages at independence. However, since gaining independence, 
Vanuatu has maintained a democratic regime, albeit with high executive instability, 
while Fiji has fluctuated between democracy, coup d’état and periods of 
authoritarian rule. Given the otherwise similar circumstances of these states, is it 
important to consider: Why was one state able to maintain democratic stability while 
the other was not? 
 
This question is of scholarly interest for two reasons. Firstly, it contributes to the 
wider understanding about the factors that influence stability in states with deeply 
divided societies. Some scholars have suggested that the third wave of democracy 
has ended and that an increasing number of states are resorting to more authoritarian 
regimes (Norris, 2008). Other scholars have observed the increase in ethnic violence 
experienced by some states (Reilly, 2001, p.2). Given this, it is important to improve 
our understanding and knowledge of the factors that impact on democratic stability, 
particularly where states have deeply divided populations.   
 
Secondly, this study will help to contribute to the understanding of the factors that 
influence stability in Fiji. Fiji, although a small state, is of geo-strategic importance 
in the South Pacific region. It hosts the United Nations and other international 
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organisations for the South Pacific area and provides crucial transport and security 
links (Firth, 2013). Fiji also adopts an influential leadership role within the region 
and is of importance to the international players in the area, including the United 
States, Russia and China. Consequently, fluctuations in Fiji’s domestic political 
situation have broader ramifications.  
 
This study applies process tracing to a comparative case study of Vanuatu and Fiji 
and assesses how the states’ institutional arrangements have impacted on stability: 
that is, the ability of a state to maintain a democratic regime without incurring 
transition to authoritarian rule. This paper applies the consociational theory of 
Lijphart (1977) and the centripetal theory of Horowitz (2014).  The study compares 
the outcome of institutional arrangements (a proportional representation electoral 
system for Vanuatu; alterative vote electoral system and power-sharing Cabinet for 
Fiji; and proportionality in public sector recruitment and government resource 
distribution) on democratic stability. The study finds that the proportional 
representation electoral system and proportionality in resource distribution results in 
greater democratic stability than the use of other power-sharing mechanisms. The 
study also considers the role of international actors in the creation of the institutional 
arrangements and how this impacts on stability, including where a foreign actor 
imposes arrangements on a state (as in Vanuatu), or where domestic political elites 
create and approve the arrangements (as in Fiji). The research did not find support 
for the hypothesis that institutional arrangements which foreign actors impose will 
result in greater democratic instability. The study concludes by discussing the 
reasons for this and identifies areas for further research. 
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Literature review and theoretical framework  
 
 
Consociational and centripetal arguments 
 
The debate in political science on how to reduce conflict and achieve democratic 
stability in deeply divided states has centred around which type of power-sharing 
institutional arrangements (consociational or centripetal) should be employed. The 
intention of both approaches is to avoid “purely majoritarian democracy” (Wolff, 
2005, p.59) and to create institutions of government that will be recognised as 
“legitimate” by ensuring the representation of all “relevant groups” in decision-
making (Wolff, 2005, p.59 & 62).  Consociationalism was proposed by Arend 
Lijphart (1977) for plural societies. “Plural societies” occur where a state has political 
cleavages that closely resemble segmental cleavages (Lijphart, 1977, p. 3). Segmental 
cleavages may be distinguished by religion, ideology, region, culture, race, ethnicity 
or language (Lijphart, 1977, p.4). For the purposes of this study, “deeply divided” 
adopts the same meaning as “plural societies.” Consociational democracies are based 
on segmental representation and have arrangements which allow political elites to 
cooperate and accommodate the needs of the different segments. Such democracies 
often have grand coalitions and proportionality in the electoral system, public sector 
employment and in the distribution of government benefits (Andeweg, 2000, p.512). 
 
While consociationalism has been highly influential in constitutional design, it has 
also been subject to significant critique. This includes arguments that the approach is 
undemocratic; that it institutionalises cleavages and reinforces segmental 
identification; that it results in demands for secession; that it is unduly narrow in its 
focus; and that it lacks clear causality (Andeweg, 2000; Horowitz, 2008; 2014). 
Scholars have also argued that political elites may experience difficulties in securing 
support from their cleavage in cooperating with, and making concessions for, people 
from “the other side” (Andeweg, 2000, p.528). However, despite these criticisms, the 
accommodative and representative elements of consociational theory remain as 
compelling arguments.  
 
Donald Horowitz (2008) has proposed an alternative approach for deeply divided 
states: centripetalism. Centripetal arrangements encourage competition among elites 
to secure support from segments other than their own. Horowitz (2008) argues that 
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these cross-cutting arrangements incentivise political elites to display moderate 
behaviour with lower use of ethnic rhetoric. This approach, however, is not without its 
criticisms. Horowitz himself has observed that elections held under a centripetal 
system may result in a majority gaining power with the help of minority votes, but 
without the minority participating in the government (Horowitz, 2008, p.1223). Other 
scholars have suggested that centripetalism may increase tensions due to controversy 
about the setting of electoral boundaries that achieve ethnic heterogeneity in each 
constituency (Wolff, 2005, p.69).   
 
Despite the criticisms of both theories, the empirical evidence provides greater 
support for the effectiveness of consociational arrangements in bringing stability and 
democracy to deeply divided states (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006, pp.46-47; Norris, 
2008, p.130) than for centripetal arrangements (Wolff, 2005, p.63). Given these 
findings, it is anticipated that where a state implements institutional arrangements that 
use a consociational approach this will result in greater democratic stability than any 
alternative arrangement.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of consociational arrangements will result in greater 
democratic stability.  
 
Consociationalism is understood in this study to mean the adoption of proportionality 
in the electoral system, the adoption of a ‘grand coalition’ in the form of a power-
sharing cabinet, proportionality in public sector employment and proportionality in 
the distribution of government resources and benefits.  
 
Role of international actors  
 
Lijphart’s consociational theory only briefly discusses the role of actors external to a 
state. He suggests that, where all domestic political elites perceive that the state faces 
a foreign threat, this will encourage elites to work together cooperatively to achieve 
stability (Lijphart, 1977, p.66). However, more recent studies have emphasised the 
much broader and varied role that international actors can play including in the 
creation of institutional arrangements for a state. This is of importance as scholars 
have observed that the way in which institutional arrangements come into force 
affects the likelihood that these arrangements will be accepted and implemented by 
political elites and consequently their chances of achieving democratic stability 
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(Norris, 2008, p.20). Specifically, Norris observes the low likelihood of success of 
institutional arrangements that are imposed by the international community, for 
example, as part of a peace agreement (Norris, 2008, p.30). 
 
Similar observations were made by scholars with reference to the imposition of the 
power-sharing Sunningdale Agreement on Northern Ireland in 1973 (Aunger, 1981) 
and in studies of democracy in African nations (Lawson, 1999). In her study on 
Africa, Lawson examined the assertion that democracy can be externally imposed on 
a country by linking incentives for democratic reform to aid and economic assistance 
(Lawson, 1999, p.4). Lawson (1999) found that incentives to democratise by external 
powers often resulted in manipulation of the incentives system by domestic political 
elites, including the unwinding of democratic arrangements once the incentives 
materialised (Lawson, 1999, p.23). Lawson concludes that democracy can only be 
achieved by domestic political actors and that externally imposed arrangements may 
exacerbate ethnic conflict and fail to provide long-term democratic stability (Lawson, 
1999, pp.23-24).  
 
A similar finding was made by Scranton (1993) in her study of Panama. Scranton 
suggests that, where foreign actors are involved in the creation of institutional 
arrangements, the public may question the legitimacy of both the arrangements and 
the government installed under them (Scranton, 1993, p.66). The legitimacy accorded 
to institutional arrangements is vital for their survival. As Finnemore (2009, p.61) 
observes, “legitimacy can only be given by others. It is conferred either by peers…or 
by those upon whom power is exercised”.  
 
Based on this literature, it is anticipated that where an international actor applies 
pressure on a state to adopt certain institutional arrangements, through coercive or 
incentive measures, the state will experience challenges to the legitimacy of the 
institutional arrangements and to the government installed under them. Alternatively, 
where political elites in a state have power and influence over the content of the 
institutional arrangements adopted, the state should experience fewer challenges to 
the legitimacy of these arrangements and greater democratic stability.   
 
Hypothesis 2: States which adopt institutional arrangements under pressure from 
international actors will experience greater democratic instability.    
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Methodology  
 
 
This study applies a qualitative research method using a comparative case study 
(Manheim et al, 2006) to allow for in-depth analysis of the variables and their 
influence on democratic stability. This study employs process tracing which allows 
for the examination of a sequence of events in order to identify the causal links 
between them (Toshkov, 2016, p.298) and thereby allowing a theory to be tested. The 
case study involves two countries: Vanuatu and Fiji. These cases, as outlined below, 
have been selected due to similarities in their history, size, location and demographics 
which allow for the use of a “most-similar-systems design” method (Manheim et al, 
2006, p.211). This method compares states with similar traits to allow for the 
assessment of the impact of independent variables.  
 
Vanuatu is a Melanesian microstate
1
 in the South Pacific. Colonial rulers, Britain and 
France, jointly administered the country, then known as the New Hebrides, under a 
‘Condominium’ arrangement from 1906. The Condominium established three 
separate systems of administration and institutions: British, French and indigenous 
New Hebridean. Due to these divided administrations, a “systematised process of 
separate Frenchisation and Britishisation of the New Hebridean peoples” occurred 
(Kalkot Matas Kele-kele quoted in Gubb, 1994, pp.4-5). This resulted in the creation 
of a deeply divided state with two ethnic groups distinguished linguistically and 
religiously: Anglophones, who were of English education and Protestant religions; 
and Francophones, who were of French education and Catholic religions.  
 
Britain anticipated the move of the New Hebrides towards independence from the 
earlier 1960s and introduced constitutional advancements (Woodward, 2014, p.67) 
while France sought to enhance its influence by turning the New Hebrides into an 
exclusively French colony (Van Trease, 1995a, p.58). However, by 1978, a national 
Representative Assembly and local municipalities were in existence and the drafting 
of a constitution was underway in response to escalating tensions and pressure from 
the indigenous independence movement (Van Trease, 1995a, pp.30-31). The New 
Hebrides gained independence on 30 July 1980 under the Constitution of Vanuatu 
                                                 
1
 A state with a population of less than 1 million (Gubb, 1994, p.1).  
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(hereafter the “Vanuatu Constitution”). At independence, 15-30%2 of the population 
were Francophones and 67% were Anglophones (Van Trease, 2005, p.299). This 
study will assess the democratic stability in Vanuatu in its early years of 
independence, from 1979 to 1994, covering a period of four elections.  
 
In parallel to Vanuatu, Fiji is a microstate in the South Pacific, with Melanesian and 
Polynesian influences, and is a former colonial territory.  After the cessation of Fiji to 
Britain in 1874, the colonial rulers developed the sugar cane industry and engaged 
indentured laborers from India to work in this trade.  Many of these labourers 
(hereafter “Indo-Fijians”) chose to remain in Fiji at the end of their indenture. By 
1970, Indo-Fijians accounted for a larger percentage of the population (approximately 
50%) than indigenous Fijians (42%) (Ghai & Cottrell, 2007, p.644).
3
 This created a 
“plural society” (Lawson, 1992, p.7) with ethnic cleavages based around “race, 
language, religion, culture, occupation and residence” (Premdas, 2002, p.20). 
 
Fiji gained its independence in 1970 under a new Constitution. The 1970 Constitution 
returned indigenous Fijian dominated governments up until 1987 when a coalition 
dominated by Indo-Fijian political parties was elected. This ‘transfer of power’ lasted 
only one month before the government was overthrown in a military coup justified on 
the grounds of preserving indigenous Fijian interests. A military-backed interim 
administration created a new Constitution in 1990 which provided for indigenous 
Fijian supremacy (Premdas, 2002, p.22). The 1990 Constitution contained provisions 
for its review within seven years and, following domestic pressures, a new 
Constitution was proclaimed in 1997. Due to significant emigration by members of 
the Indo-Fijian community, the ethnic composition of Fiji had altered by 1997 with 
indigenous Fijians becoming the majority (51% of the population) and Indo-Fijians 
the minority (43%) (Premdas, 2002, p.17). This study will examine the democratic 
stability in Fiji from 1997 to 2014 when it operated under the 1997 Constitution. This 
Constitution has been selected as it is considered to have the attributes of a liberal 
constitution (Hughes & Laksman, 2001, p.927) including mechanisms for 
consensuses and interethnic cooperation (Premdas, 2002). In this respect, the 
                                                 
2
 Some studies put this figure at 15% (Van Trease, 2005, p.299) and others as high as 30% (Premdas, 
1987, p.49). 
3
 I have created percentages from the numerical population figures provided by Ghai & Cottrell in 
their study.  
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outcomes of the institutional arrangements made under this constitution will be of 
greater interest to scholars. 
 
While there are similarities between the two cases, they do differ in the values of the 
independent variables. Vanuatu adopted institutional arrangements that use a 
consociational approach (proportional representation (hereafter “PR) electoral system 
and proportionality in resource allocation), while Fiji used a hybrid approach 
incorporating a centripetal electoral system, a consociational power-sharing cabinet 
and proportionality in public sector appointments. Regarding the role of international 
actors, Vanuatu faced significant pressure from its colonial rulers to accept certain 
institutional arrangements while, in contrast, Fiji’s political elites exercised control 
over the contents of its constitution.  
 
It is also important to acknowledge that there are differences in the time periods 
between the two case studies (1979 to 1994 and 1997 to 2014) and that a considerable 
change occurred in international politics between these periods: notably, the end of 
the Cold War. This will be considered in the results on the role of international actors. 
In addition, the variety and availability of research materials differ over these time 
periods with a greater number of primary materials available for Fiji during the 2000s 
than for Vanuatu during the 1980s. This study therefore uses a combination of 
primary and secondary sources including: scholarly articles; media reports; political 
speeches; reports from non-government organisations; reports from international 
organisations; and reports from third party countries.  
 
The study will assess the levels of democratic stability in Fiji and Vanuatu. 
“Democratic stability” refers to the ability of a state to sustain a democratic regime 
without experiencing regime change to authoritarianism. This definition aligns with 
that used in recent studies in the field (Norris, 2008, p.3) and is more suitable than 
Lijphart’s (1977, p.4) concept of “political stability” for developing countries that 
may have poorly established bureaucracies. To determine the level of democratic 
stability in Vanuatu and Fiji, the study will assess: the number of coup d’état 
experienced; the number of periods of authoritarian or military rule; and the length of 
authoritarian or military rule. This will provide an indication of the scale of difference 
in the democratic stability experienced between the two cases.  
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This study will examine the impact on democratic stability of the institutional 
arrangements of Fiji and Vanuatu. This includes assessing the impact of arrangements 
in the electoral system, cabinet, public sector appointments and in the allocation of 
government resources. Support for this hypothesis will occur where it is found that 
consociational institutional arrangements result in fewer challenges to the legitimacy 
of the arrangements themselves, and to the governments installed under them, by both 
political elites and the public resulting in greater democratic stability. 
 
Finally, the study will assess the role of the international community in the imposition 
of the institutional arrangements. Support for this hypothesis will occur where 
international actors put significant pressure on a state to accept certain institutional 
arrangements, through incentive or coercive measures, and where political elites and 
the public subsequently challenge the legitimacy of these arrangements and/or the 
governments installed under them. This may occur through protest, civil 
disobedience, or by elites failing to abide by constitutional processes, resulting in 
reduced democratic stability.  
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Empirical Analysis 
 
Democratic Stability 
 
 
There is a noticeable variation in the levels of democratic stability experienced by 
Vanuatu and Fiji. For the period under examination in Vanuatu there were two 
periods of instability, however neither resulted in a transition to authoritarian rule. 
The first period of instability occurred after the 1979 election in the period leading 
up to, and immediately after, independence on 30 July 1980. This instability 
involved secession movements on the islands of Santo and Tanna which had a large 
Francophone population. The secession movement was made reportedly in response 
to the substantial election victory of the Anglophone Vanua’aku Party (VP) in both 
the national and the regional council elections, however there is evidence that 
foreign actors, including American entrepreneurs, manipulated the movement for 
their own interests (Woodward, 2014, p.47). The “Santo Rebellion” as it was 
known, involved less than 20%
4
 of the residents on Santo (Gubb, 1994, p.10) and 
was brought under control with military assistance from neighbouring Papua New 
Guinea with low casualties
5
 (Gubb, 1994, p.25).  
 
The second period of instability occurred during 1988 and 1989 and started with 
civil disturbances, including protests resulting in rioting, over land reforms (Van 
Trease, 1995b, pp.77-78). However, analysis of these protests suggest that the main 
controversy surrounded a failure amongst villagers to agree on how to divide land 
compensation, rather than on the specific land policy of the Government (Van 
Trease, 1995b, p.78). The instability extended to Parliament where a split occurred 
in the VP leadership leading to an attempted no-confidence motion, the dismissal of 
several party members by the Prime Minister and a boycott of Parliament by the 
Opposition (Gubb, 1994, p.51). The matter culminated when the President attempted 
to dissolve Parliament and to establish an interim government (Gubb, 1994, p.51). 
However, Prime Minister Lini restored Parliament within half an hour of the 
President’s dissolution and, two days later, the President and members of the interim 
government were arrested and charged. The Supreme Court ruled that the President 
                                                 
4
 I have created a percentage from the figure that approximately 2,000 to 3,000 people out of 
16,000 living on Santo participated in the rebellion.  
5
 One person was killed.  
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had acted unconstitutionally and it ordered him to stay out of politics (Gubb, 1994, 
p.52; Van Trease, 1995b, p.91).  
 
These are the only instances of instability, as defined in this study, during the period 
examined. However, for completeness, it should be noted that following 1994, while 
Vanuatu experienced executive instability (including much use of the no-confidence 
motion) and fragmentation amongst political parties, it has not experienced periods 
of authoritarian rule.  This outcome stands in stark contrast to the experience of Fiji.   
 
The 1997 Fijian Constitution, and the governments installed under it, were twice 
subject to overthrow by a coup and periods of authoritarian rule. The first coup 
occurred on 17 May 2000 and was led by a civilian, George Speight, and a group of 
armed indigenous Fijian supremacists (US Department of State, 2001). They took 
the Indo-Fijian led Chaundhry Government and other members of Parliament 
hostage and held them in a siege for 56 days. The leaders of the coup claimed that 
their intention was to restore the paramountcy of indigenous Fijian interests (Lal & 
Hereniko, 2002, p.150). Ethnic violence erupted and was inflicted on the Indo-Fijian 
community, including the destruction of businesses and the removal of people from 
their lands. In July 2000, the military created a civilian interim administration. After 
numerous legal appeals, the Court of Appeal found in March 2001 that the 1997 
Constitution remained in force. In contraction to the Court’s ruling, the newly 
appointed President, Ratu Iloilo, dismissed Prime Minister Chaudhry and Parliament 
and established a military-backed caretaker government until he called elections (US 
Department of State, 2002). The elections restored democratic government in 
September 2001.  
 
The second coup, led by the military leader Commodore Voreque Bainimarama, 
occurred on 5 December 2006 and it overthrew the government that had been 
elected in May 2006. Bainimarama declared that the coup was due to the unfair 
favouring of indigenous Fijians and corruption by the Qarase Government (US 
Department of State, 2007). Bainimarama installed himself as Prime Minister and 
established an interim government. Qarase challenged the legitimacy of the interim 
government and on 9 April 2009 the Court of Appeal declared the coup and interim 
government to be unlawful (Court of Appeal, 2009). In response, President Iliolu 
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abrogated the 1997 Constitution, dismissed all judges and judicial officials and 
appointed Bainimarama as Prime Minister for a further 5-year term (President of the 
Republic of the Fiji Islands, 2009; Markovic, 2009). This non-elected administration 
ruled Fiji though military decrees for six years until it held elections in September 
2014 under a new Constitution. 
 
As demonstrated, there is a noticeable difference in the democratic stability between 
the two cases: Vanuatu experienced no transitions to authoritarian rule while Fiji 
experienced two such transitions resulting in over eight years of authoritarian rule 
either by the military or by non-elected interim administrations. The study will now 
assess how the creation and content of each states’ institutional arrangements 
impacted on this outcome.  
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Institutional Arrangements  
 
Electoral Systems 
 
The Vanuatu Constitution adopts a PR
6
 (Van Trease, 2005) voting system: the single 
non-transferable vote (hereafter “SNTV”). The British Residency proposed the use 
of SNTV for the 1975 National Assembly elections to ensure representation for the 
Francophone minority and because the simplicity of this system was appropriate 
given the high degree of illiteracy in the New Hebrides (Woodward, 2014, p.36). 
The system adopted multi-seat constituencies based on population size to avoid 
likely controversies arising from establishing constituent boundaries within islands 
(Woodward, 2014, p.37). The constituencies ranged in size from single-seat 
constituencies to seven seat constituencies. Although the Vanuatu Constitution 
allows for other electoral systems to be used, provided that they contain “an element 
of proportional representation so as to ensure fair representation of different political 
groups and opinion” (Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu, 1980, Article 17(1)) 
Vanuatu has continued to use SNTV (Woodward, 2014).  
 
In contrast, the Fiji Constitution adopted the more majoritarian electoral system of  
the Alternative Vote (hereafter “AV”). The AV system involves voters listing their 
preferences in order: a voter’s later preferences are redistributed to other candidates 
where their top choice candidate is in a losing position. AV adopts centripetal 
elements by encouraging the cooperation and trading of voting preferences between 
ethnic political parties leading up to the election (Horowitz, 2008, p.1217). The 
desired outcome was to create a more moderate government, to encourage coalition-
building before elections and in forming government, and to avoid the “polarized 
partisan adversarial competitive politics” previously observed in Fiji (Premdas, 
2002, p.25).  This system was used in conjunction with communally-based 
Parliamentary seating. Two-thirds of seats in the House of Representatives (lower 
house) were reserved for voting through separate electoral rolls by ethnicity, with 23 
assigned to “Fijians” (indigenous Fijians), 19 to “Indians” (Indo-Fijians), 3 to 
                                                 
6
 There is debate among scholars on whether SNTV should be classed as a PR system. However, for 
the purposes of this study, it is classed as such as it contains notably more elements of 
proportionality in its design than the Alternative Vote. 
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General Electors
7
 and 1 to the Council of Rotuma (a minority ethnic group) (Fiji 
Islands Constitutional Amendment Act 1997, Article 51). The remaining 25 seats 
were open seats voted for by the open electoral role.  
 
The outcomes of the elections for Vanuatu (Table 1) and Fiji (Table 2) are below. 
 
                                                 
7
 ‘General electors’ refers to those who are “a roll of voters who are registered otherwise than as 
Fijians, Indians or Rotumans” (Fiji Islands Constitutional Amendment Act 1997, Article 51(iv)).  
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Table 1: New Hebrides/Vanuatu Election Results 1979 to 1991
8
 
Year Party
9
 % of 
vote 
share 
Seats 
won 
Prop 
seats 
% 
Election outcome 
1979 Vanua’aku Party (VP) 62.3 26 66.6 Elections for the National Assembly of the New Hebrides which became the 
Vanuatu Government at independence. The Anglophone dominated party, VP, 
won a majority in the Parliament and formed government with Friar Walter 
Lini installed as Prime Minister.   
Moderate Party 10.9 5 12.8 
Federated Party 7.1 2 5.1 
Namangi Aute 4.2 2 5.1 
Jon Frum Movement 2.2 1 2.6 
Kapei 2.1 1 2.6 
Independents  8.1 2 5.1 
      
1983 Vanua’aku Party (VP) 55.1 24 61.5 The VP continued to hold power, although with a decline in its vote share. The 
Francophone UMP saw a rise in its vote share and number of seats won in 
Parliament. Fr Walter Lini continued as Prime Minister.  
Union of Moderate Parties (UMP) 28.6 12 30.8 
Namangi Aute 2.6 2 5.1 
Fren Melanesian Party 2.3 1 2.6 
      
1987 Vanua’aku Party (VP) 47.3 25 54.3 The number of seats in Parliament increased to 46 in line with population 
increases. The VP continued in Government with a narrow majority.  Union of Moderate Parties (UMP) 39.9 19 41.3 
Fren Melanesian Party 2.0 1 2.2 
Independents 4.1 1 2.2 
      
1991 Union of Moderate Parties (UMP) 30.6 19 41.3 The Francophone dominated UMP formed Government in a coalition with the 
Anglophone NUP under a Memorandum of Understanding. Fr Lini left the VP 
several months before the election and formed the NUP. He was installed as 
Deputy Prime Minister with Maxime Carlot appointed Prime Minister. The 
Cabinet had Francophone and Anglophone representatives for the first time.  
Vanua’aku Party (VP) 22.6 10 21.7 
National United Party (NUP) 20.4 10 21.7 
Melanesian Progressive Party 15.4 4 8.7 
Tan Union  4.6 1 2.2 
Nagriamel 2.9 1 2.2 
Fren Melanesian Party 
 
1.9 1 2.2 
  
                                                 
8
 Nohlen et al, 2001, pp.842 & 844.   
9
 Showing only those parties that won seats.  
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Table 2: Fiji Elections results under the 1997 Constitution 
Year Main Parties Ethnic Seats
10
 Seats 
won 
Election outcome 
1999
11
 Fiji Labour Party (FLP) Indian (19) Open (18) 37 The FLP (Indo-Fijian based party) formed a multi-party 
coalition government with three indigenous Fijian 
parties: FAP, VLV and PANU. The leader of FLP, 
Mahendra Chaundry, became Fiji’s first Indo-Fijian 
Prime Minister.  
Fiji Association Party (FAP) Fijian (9) Open (1) 10 
Soqosoqo ni Nakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) Fijian (5) Open (3) 8 
Party of National Union (PANU) Fijian (4) 4 
Veitokani ni Lewenivanua Vakaristo (VLV) 
(Christian Democratic Alliance) 
Fijian (3) 3 
United General Party (UGP) General (1) Open (1) 2 
Independents Fijian (1) Open (1) General (2) 
Rotuman (1) 
5 
Others Fijian (1) Open (1) 2 
 
2001
12
 Soqosoqo Dauvata Ni Lewenivenua (SDL)  Fijian (19) Open (12) 31 The indigenous Fijian Party, SDL formed a multi-party 
coalition with another indigenous party: MAV. MAV 
was established by George Speight who lead the 2000 
coup that overthrew Parliament. The leader of the SDL, 
Laisenia Qarase, became Prime Minister.  
Fiji Labour Party (FLP) Indian (19) Open (8) 27 
Conservative Alliance/ Matanitu vanua 
(MAV) 
Fijian (5) Open (1) 6 
New Labour Unity Party (NLUP) General (1) Open (1)  2 
National Federation Party (NFP) Open (1) 1 
United General Party (UGP) General (1)  1 
Independents  General (1) Rotuman (1)  2 
 
2006
13
  Soqosoqo Dauvata Ni Lewenivenua (SDL) Fijian (23) Open (13) 36 Shortly before the election, MAV dissolved and become 
part of SDL. The indigenous-Fijian based SDL formed 
government with the support of two independents. 
Qarase continued as Prime Minister. The Cabinet was 
multi-party, including 9 members from the Indo-Fijian 
FLP.  
Fiji Labour Party (FLP) Indian (19) Open (12) 31 
United People’s Party (UPP) General (2) 2 
Independents  Rotuman (1) General (1) 2 
                                                 
10 
This refers to the ethnic roll and open seats allocated under Article 51 of the Fiji Constitution.  
11 
Nohlen et al, 2001, p.668.  
12
 Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2001.  
13
 European Union, 2006, pp.20-21.  
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Election results  
 
It is anticipated that the use of a PR electoral system, as proposed by consociational 
theory, should result in greater democratic stability than any alternative electoral 
system. The election results show that, for Vanuatu, the SNTV system resulted in 
roughly proportionate figures between the percentage of the vote share to the 
percentage of seats won (although arguably the system did favour larger parties 
more) and few wasted votes occurred (Van Trease, 2005). While the system did 
return an Anglophone-dominated VP Government for the first three elections, it was 
observed that “there was a significant Francophone presence inside parliament 
which enabled a rapprochement between the two sides towards the end of the 1980s” 
(Van Trease, 2005, p. 321).  This culminated in 1991 when a multi-party, multi-
ethnic government coalition was elected with a Francophone party (the Union of 
Moderate Parties, hereafter “UMP”) as the major coalition partner. This transfer of 
power occurred in a peaceful way without challenges to its legitimacy. A brief look 
at further Vanuatu elections shows a continuing pattern of multi-party coalition 
governments (Woodward, 2014). This led to the conclusion that the “SNTV system 
assisted the country in transcending the divisions experienced at the time of the 1980 
Santo rebellion” (Van Trease, 2005, p.321). 
 
Fiji’s electoral system achieved its intended outcomes in its first election with the 
creation of a multi-ethnic, multi-party coalition, although this was overthrown by a 
civilian coup. This electoral pattern did not continue with the following two 
governments dominated by coalitions of parties from the same ethnic background. 
As observed by Ghai and Cottrell (2007, pp.659-660) this may have occurred due to 
parties exchanging preference under AV differently to that anticipated, with parties 
more focused on reducing their risk of electoral defeat than exchanging preferences 
with parties with similar or complementary policies. Ghai and Cottrell (2007, p.660) 
attribute this to a common mentality in developing countries where the desire to win 
power is viewed as an end in itself with little focus given to the practicalities of 
governing after the election. This outcome lead to the 2006 election observer 
mission to declare that “the combination of the 46 communal constituencies and the 
ongoing use of the Alternative Vote system have not had the desired effect of 
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diminishing the stratification of Fiji’s electorate and political parties” (European 
Union, 2006, p.24). Ultimately, the legitimacy of two governments in Fiji installed 
under AV were challenged in coups, in comparison to the relative stability 
experienced by the governments installed under SNTV in Vanuatu.  
 
There is one further point of interest in the election results. In both cases, although 
coalitions were formed by parties, difficulties arose in the creation of these. In Fiji’s 
case, an attempt to form an alliance between the National Federation Party (NFP) 
and Soqosoqo ni Nakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) in the lead up to the 1999 election 
failed as the leaders of both parties were unable to secure support from their 
respective communities (Ratuva, 2016, p.28). Supporters of the Indo-Fijian NFP 
party did not wish to support an alliance with the political elite who staged the 1987 
coup against them, while indigenous Fijian supporters of the SVT believed that their 
interests were been compromised. Consequently, both parties lost a significant 
number of seats in the election (SVT lost 24 seats and the NFP lost 20) (Ratuva, 
2016, p.28). Similar difficulties occurred in Vanuatu with the attempted alliance 
between the Melanesian Progressive Party (MPP), run by a former senior member of 
the Anglophone VP, and Nagriamel, the Francophone party lead by the Santo 
Rebellion leader Jimmy Stevens (Van Trease, 1995c, pp.130-131). This finding does 
question the feasibility of forming political coalitions between groups that were 
formerly opponents. 
 
Power-sharing cabinet 
 
It is anticipated that where a state implements a power-sharing cabinet, in line with 
consociational theory, that this should result in greater democratic stability. The Fiji 
Constitution required the establishment of a multi-party Cabinet that reflected the 
make-up of the House of Representatives as closely as possible (Fiji Islands 
Constitutional Amendment Act 1997, Article 99). Any party who won at least 10% 
of the seats in the House of Representatives was required to be invited by the Prime 
Minister to join the Cabinet and to be allocated Cabinet seats in proportion to their 
numbers in the House.  
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Following the 1999 election, the indigenous Fijian party SVT won more than 10% 
of the seats in the House of Representatives and was entitled to join the Cabinet. 
However, when offered Cabinet places, the SVT requested that several conditions be 
met first before giving their acceptance. Prime Minister Chaudhry viewed the 
conditions as a rejection of the invitation to join the Cabinet (Ghai & Cottrell, 2007, 
p.661). The matter was challenged through the courts who agreed with the Prime 
Minister’s stance due to the nature of the conditions (Ghai & Cottrell, 2007, p.661).  
 
Squabbles over Cabinet seats continued to be a feature in future Fijian elections. 
Following the 2001 election Prime Minister Qarase invited the Fiji Labour Party 
(FLP) to join the Cabinet as they were entitled to approximately eight seats (United 
Nations General Assembly, 2001, p.6). While the FLP responded positively to the 
offer, the Prime Minister interpreted the response as containing conditions and 
consequently viewed this as unacceptable (United Nations General Assembly, 2001, 
p.6). The Prime Minister formed a cabinet without any members of the FLP and 
suggested that a multiparty Cabinet would “not contribute to a stable and workable 
government so essential to the promotion of national unity in Fiji” (Fiji Islands 
Parliamentary Chamber, 2001).  After a lengthy legal dispute over the Cabinet 
composition, the FLP decided not to pursue the issue further describing the 
invitation to join the cabinet as “tokenism” and stating that it would not join a 
government that contained “criminal elements” (Fiji Times, 2004a). Indeed, it was 
not until the 2006 elections that Fiji successfully formed a multi-party cabinet.  
 
When compared to the institutional arrangements in Vanuatu, it appears that the 
power-sharing Cabinet contributed to the instability in Fiji. Although the Vanuatu 
cabinets were not representative of the Parliament, and rather were generally 
exclusively made up of members of the governing party (particularly up to 1991) the 
Constitution did not set an expectation that the Cabinet would be representative. 
Therefore, while there are reports of opposition political elites feeling some 
resentment at not been invited to join the Cabinet after the 1979 election (Van 
Trease, 1995a, pp.53-54), it did not result in the lengthy legal disputes and the 
“prescription for political paralysis” as in Fiji (Fiji Times, 2004b). Arguably, the 
lack of cooperation shown by PM Chaudhry in Fiji over negotiations for Cabinet 
seats following the 1999 election added to his perceived anti-indigenous Fijian 
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stance which was given as the reason for the coup that overthrow his government 
less than a year into its term. The lengthy legal challenges and uncertainty over the 
Cabinet composition following the 2001 election led the US Department of State 
(2002; 2004) to observe that the divide between the FLP and Soqosoqo Dauvata Ni 
Lewenivenua (SDL) was a hindrance to longer term political stability and had 
impacted negatively on the Fijian economy. It appears, in comparing these two 
deeply divided states, that the failure by elites to be able to form a multi-party 
Cabinet contributed to greater democratic instability in Fiji.   
 
Public sector appointments  
 
It is anticipated that where a state adopts a proportional approach to its public sector 
appointments, as advocated by consociational theory, that this should result in 
greater democratic stability. In both Vanuatu and Fiji, there is evidence to suggest 
that disproportionate public sector recruitment was a cause of tension. The brevity of 
the Vanuatu Constitution (approximately 20 pages in length) provides few details on 
the operation of the public service and it does not contain provisions about the ethnic 
representation of public servants (Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu, 1980, 
Article 57). In contrast, the Fiji Constitution provides comprehensive details on the 
make-up and operation of the public service and requires that the composition of the 
public service reflect as closely as possible the ethnic composition of the population 
(Fiji Islands Constitutional Amendment Act 1997, Article 140(d)). It also provides 
for the use of affirmative action to achieve this (Fiji Islands Constitutional 
Amendment Act 1997, Article 44).  
 
The Vanuatu Government inherited three separate bureaucracies and institutional 
structures from its colonial rulers (French, British and New Hebridean). These 
bureaucracies were inflated with 93% of government revenues spent on public 
servant salaries in 1976 (Guest, 1980). The new Vanuatu Government sought to 
create a unitary system that would be more economical and affordable for a small 
country largely dependent on foreign aid (Ross, 1990, p.74). There is evidence that 
the Anglophone dominated governments from 1979 to 1990 did appoint many 
Anglophones to the new unified public service. The Vanuatu Government suggested 
that they did this as Francophones lacked the appropriate skills, qualifications and 
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experience required due to lack of access to tertiary education (Van Trease, 1995a, 
p.54).  The consequence of this was that by 1991 Francophones made up only 10% 
of the public service (Premdas & Steeves, 1995, p.221). The Francophone 
Opposition used this outcome extensively to portray the government as anti-
Francophone and to stir up tensions (Van Trease, 1995a, p.54). Following success in 
the 1991 elections, the Francophone led coalition sought to redress the imbalance in 
the public service by retiring senior officers and replacing them with Francophones. 
However, this action also caused tension and instability, including within the 
governing coalition, where two ministers were dismissed for refusing to terminate 
specific public servants (Van Trease, 2005, p.314).  
 
A similar pattern is observed in the public service in Fiji. Under the 1990 
Constitution, the Government sought to raise the proportion of indigenous Fijians 
and Rotumans in the public service, resulting in complaints from Indo-Fijians that, 
despite their experience, they would not be promoted beyond middle management 
(US Department of State, 1995). By 1997, indigenous Fijians dominated the police 
(75% of the police force), the military (99%) and the rest of the public service (90% 
of the Permanent Secretaries in the public sector and most senior positions in the 
justice system) (Premdas, 2002, pp.27 & 30). To redress this, the Chaudhry 
Government sought to reform the public sector to better reflect the composition of 
the population and amended affirmative action policies to focus on genuine need 
rather than ethnicity (affirmative action had previously been reserved exclusively for 
indigenous Fijians). These changes were received with criticism, protest, resistance 
and poor cooperation by the indigenous Fijian community who perceived them as a 
withdrawal of their privileges (Premdas, 2002, pp.28 and 30). The consequence of 
these actions, in addition to the overthrow of the Chaundhry Government for its 
perceived anti-indigenous stand, was a reversal of these policies by the indigenous-
Fijian lead governments after 2001. The US Department of State observed in 2004 
that Indo-Fijians were under-represented in all levels of government (US 
Department of State, 2005) and the Fiji Human Rights Commission found in 2006 
that the affirmative action policies of the government unconstitutionally favoured 
indigenous Fijians (US Department of State, 2007). This arguably contributed to 
claims that the 2006 Government was unfairly pro-indigenous; a primary reason 
given for its overthrow by the military (Goiran, 2008, p.8). 
Bronwyn Cooper, s1790846 
23 
 
 
Arguably, in both cases, disproportionality in the ethnic composition of the public 
sector, and attempts to re-balance this, was a cause of tension and unrest. In Fiji’s 
case, however, this was exacerbated because the policies caused tensions in both 
communities: Indo-Fijians resented their lack of representation and discriminatory 
practices in public sector employment, while indigenous Fijians resented their 
perceived loss of privileges and paramountcy in public sector employment when 
reforms were introduced. In contrast, Vanuatu primarily experienced tensions from 
the Francophone minority.  
 
This finding supports the work of McGarry and O’Leary (2006) on Northern 
Ireland, who determined that it is important to accommodate representation at the 
legislative level and throughout the public service in deeply divided states. The 
evidence from Fiji also supports the findings of Thomas Sowell (2004) about the 
difficulties involved in amending affirmative action policies. This is particularly so 
where affirmative action policies relate to indigenous groups who often believe that 
they are entitled to benefits due purely to their indigenous status (Sowell, 2004).   
 
Distribution of government benefits  
 
It is anticipated that where a state exercises proportionality in the distribution of its 
resources, as advocated by consociational theory, that this will lead to improved 
democratic stability. In the Fijian context, the evidence suggests that some of the 
resource policies promoted by the Chaundhry Government following the 1999 
election exacerbated ethnic tensions and instability. Freedom House (2002) reported 
that Chaundhry “soon angered many indigenous Fijians with his policies on land and 
logging”, including pressuring indigenous Fijian land owners to renew leases with 
only minimal increases in rent. As indigenous Fijians owned 83% of the land 
(Freedom House, 2002) this was largely perceived as an anti-indigenous Fijian 
policy. The Chaundhry Government’s other policies were also viewed as having 
“contributed to the impoverishment and disaffection of indigenous Fijians” (Lal & 
Hereniko, 2002, p.150).  These views ultimately lead to the overthrow of the 
Chaundhry government on the grounds of protecting indigenous Fijian rights.  
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The Fijians Governments, following the 2000 coup, also show evidence of 
promoting policies that resulted in a disproportionate share of government resources. 
During 2001, the Government introduced an education policy that was claimed to be 
discriminatory as it directed funds to indigenous Fijian schools and teacher training, 
while funds for Indo-Fijian schools were withheld (US Department of State, 2003). 
Between 2002 and 2006, the Government introduced four further policies that were 
overtly favourable to indigenous Fijians (the Rural Housing Scheme, indigenous 
lands rights, indigenous foreshore fishing rights, and the Reconciliation, Tolerance 
and Unity Bill) (US Department of State, 2004; 2007). This later bill was highly 
controversial as it sought to create an amnesty for those who participated in the 2000 
coup. The Government responded to criticism of this bill by releasing from prison 
many of the individuals convicted of the coup on ‘health grounds’, although this was 
widely perceived as a political move (US Department of State, 2006). Tensions were 
exacerbated when one of the released individuals took up a seat in the Cabinet. 
These specific actions were part of a continuing pattern from 2001 onwards of 
promoting policies that were advantageous to indigenous Fijians (US Department of 
State, 2006). This pro-indigenous stance of the government was the key reason 
given for its overthrow in 2006 and the subsequent transition of Fiji to authoritarian 
rule.  
 
In contrast, the policies of the Vanuatu Government largely resulted in an equitable 
and proportionate distribution of resources. The US Department of State routinely 
observed in its human rights reports that, although the level of government services 
available were ‘basic’, they were “provided without discrimination” (US 
Department of State, 1983 – 1989). Indeed, the only area of specific contention on 
resource provision related to the creation of a unitary education system after 
independence. The Vanuatu Government inherited the French and British schooling 
systems which operated differently (Van Trease, 1995a, pp.55-56). The French 
system used expensive expatriate teachers and cost approximately $USD 13 million 
to run in 1979, compared to the British system which cost $USD 2.5 million (Guest, 
1980). To provide education that was affordable, the Vanuatu Government 
consolidated schools, closed smaller schools and introduced a general school fee 
(Van Trease, 1995a, p.56). The enrolment in French schools, which had previously 
been free, dropped to 38.4% by 1990 (Van Trease, 1995a, p.56). While the 
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Francophone Opposition portrayed these changes as signals of the anti-Francophone 
position of the Vanuatu Government, they did not create the degree of instability as 
witnessed in Fiji. It is likely that the much broader range of areas in Fiji where 
discriminatory policies were introduced (land, education, housing, fishing and coup 
immunity) were the likely cause of the greater instability experienced there.  
 
Overall, this finding shows that the greater proportionality exercised in the 
distribution of government resources in Vanuatu, as advocated by consociational 
theory, resulted in improved democratic stability than the discriminatory distribution 
practised in Fiji.  
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Role of International Actors  
 
It is now important to consider how the institutional arrangements in Fiji and 
Vanuatu were created and what role international actors played in this. It is 
anticipated that where international actors applied pressure, through incentive or 
coercive measures, on a state to adopt certain institutional arrangements that this 
will result in democratic instability. 
 
Drafting of the Constitutions 
 
The creation of the institutional arrangements in Vanuatu was linked to the country 
gaining independence from its French and British colonial rulers. France, due to its 
desire to maintain its influence in the South Pacific and its “great-power status” 
(Gubb, 1994, p.6), particularly given the global context of the Cold War, was 
reluctant to grant the New Hebrides its independence. The French Residency 
therefore set strict condition on the steps that New Hebrideans would need to take, 
and the conditions that the Constitution would need to contain, in order for it to 
approve independence. The conditions, announced by the French Minister for 
Overseas Department and Territories, Paul Dijoud, on 11 August 1987 included the 
drafting of a constitution which would preserve the French language, guarantee 
regionalisation and include proportional representation for the recognition of 
minority rights; and the holding of new elections (Van Trease, 1995a, p.38).  
 
France and Britain created a Council of Ministers, with members from the two main 
political parties, and British and French consultants, to draft a constitution proposal. 
This proposal was to be submitted to the British and French Residencies for their 
approval (Ghai, 1988, p. 16). The Council of Ministers, due to a desire to avoid a 
bureaucratic process that would exclude public participation, created a 
Constitutional Planning Committee (hereafter “CPC”) with representatives including 
chiefs, women, political parties and churches. The CPC debated various parts of the 
constitution and developed a draft for approval. Although the CPC reached 
consensus on most key issues for the constitution, its draft constitution was subject 
to meeting the conditions set by Dijoud, as well as overall approval by the British 
and French Residencies. This occurred at a meeting between the two colonial rulers 
where “important changes were more or less imposed” on the Constitution (Ghai, 
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1988, pp.10-11). The French increased the power of the President and resolved the 
outstanding matter of decentralisation by establishing regional councils on Tanna 
and Santo (Ghai, 1988, p.16). This final amendment was only reluctantly accepted 
by the Francophone Moderate Parties after significant pressure was applied by the 
French Residency (Ghai, 1988, p.16). In return for accepting the Constitution, the 
French Residency agreed on 19 July 1980 to give the New Hebrides its 
independence; this occurred just 11 days before independence was declared on 30 
July 1980 (House of Commons, 1980). In summary, the Condominium used the 
sovereignty and independence of Vanuatu as an incentive to impose certain 
institutional arrangements. 
 
In contrast, the Fijian Constitutional drafting process was dominated by domestic 
political elites. Fiji had faced cuts in aid and experienced diplomatic isolation after 
the 1987 coup and the 1990 Constitution which the international community 
considered to be racially divisive with insufficient political representation for all 
groups (Parliament of Australia, 1990). However, the 1990 Constitution was also 
seen as a step towards a return to democracy (Parliament of Australia, 1990) and 
therefore, by the time of the drafting of the 1997 Constitution, most of the sanctions 
against Fiji had been eased. It is plausible that the easing of these sanctions may 
have followed from the decline in international tensions following the end of the 
Cold War. The international community, therefore, while exerting some indirect 
pressure on Fiji, did not impose conditions on the establishment of the 1997 
Constitution or its content.  
 
Rather, the decision to review the constitution was initiated by political elites in 
response to a clause in the 1990 Constitution requiring its review within seven years 
and as part of an agreement with the Indo-Fijian dominated FLP to secure their 
participation in the legislature (Fiji Islands Parliamentary Chamber, 1992).  An 
independent commission (hereafter “the Reeve’s Commission”) was appointed. The 
terms of reference required the Reeve’s Commission to create a constitution that 
would “promote racial harmony [and] national unity” and that would “guarantee full 
protection and promotion of the rights, interests and concerns of the indigenous 
Fijian and Rotuman people” (Fiji Constitutional Review Commission, 2006, p.2). 
The Reeve’s Commission undertook extensive consultations and made over 600 
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recommendations. The vast bulk of the recommendations were accepted by the 
Parliament (577 out of 694) with 40 amended and 77 rejected (Lal, 2003, p.673). 
The Parliament unanimously approved the final version of the Constitution: this 
included members of the indigenous Fijian government and the Indo-Fijian 
opposition (Cottrell & Ghai, 2007, p.169). In Fiji, therefore, political elites 
controlled the drafting and content of the institutional arrangements.  
 
Impact on democratic stability  
 
In Vanuatu’s case, once its incentive for accepting the institutional arrangements had 
materialised (independence had been achieved), there is little evidence of political 
elites or the public challenging the legitimacy of the Constitution or the government 
established under it. Although the Anglophone VP party held a majority in 
Parliament, including the two-thirds majority required to make constitutional 
amendments, they made few attempts to do so. The constitutional amendments that 
they did pass (Constitutional First Amendment Act 1980 and Constitutional Second 
Amendment Act 1981) made only inconsequential changes. The only substantial 
alteration was the removal from Article 84 of the Constitution of the requirement 
that any change to the powers and organisation of the regional councils be subject to 
a referendum (Ghai, 1988, p.23). It is suggested that the Anglophone VP “accepted 
the provision for the referendum with considerable misgivings” and consequently 
unwound the provision (Ghai, 1988, p.23). However, once the transfer of power 
occurred in 1991, the Francophone dominated coalition did not attempt to re-
introduce the provision and instead used its majority in Parliament to alter the 
number of councils.  There is no evidence to suggest that the Vanuatu Government 
sought to amend the official language provisions (Van Trease, 1995a, p.54), which 
recognised Bislama (pidgin), English and French, nor to amend the requirement for 
proportionality in the electoral system.   
 
With regards to the legitimacy of Parliament, there was the single incident of the 
boycott of Parliament by members of the Opposition followed by the attempt to 
dissolve the Parliament by the President in 1988. However, even during this process, 
respect was shown by political elites for the rule of law set by the Constitution (for 
example, by abiding by Supreme Court constitutional decisions) and Parliament 
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resumed operation in accordance with the Constitution. Therefore, in Vanuatu’s 
case, the heavy influence of the Condominium in the creation of the institutional 
arrangements did not lead to challenges against the legitimacy of the government as 
expected. In contrast, the legitimacy of Fiji’s Constitution, and the governments 
installed under it, was challenged numerous times by elites (for examples, in the 
squabbles over the power-sharing Cabinet); by the President (who ignored court 
decisions, including the court orders to reinstate the democratically elected 
governments following the 2000 and 2006 coups) and twice by the public and 
military with the overthrow of the democratically elected government.  
 
This outcome, therefore, does not support the hypothesis. However, there are two 
possible reasons for this. The first was the desire by Vanuatu to achieve and 
maintain its independence. France was extremely reluctant to give the New Hebrides 
its independence and sought to undermine the stability of the new country during the 
1980s, including by supporting the Francophone political parties. It is therefore 
possible that this threat to the state’s independence encouraged the pro-
independence VP Government to give greater support and legitimacy to the 
Constitution. This was not the situation in Fiji where Britain had willingly granted it 
independence 20 years earlier. This finding supports the assertion by Lijphart (1977) 
that foreign threats can encourage stability through elite cooperation although, in 
Vanuatu’s case, France was only viewed as a ‘threat’ by the Anglophone political 
parties. Further research, however, would be required to fully assess the impact of 
this factor.   
 
The second explanation is that instability may arise where those who created the 
institutional arrangements do not get the outcome that they expect from the 
arrangements. In Vanuatu’s case, the French Residency expected that the 
institutional arrangements would avoid an Anglophone majority government and 
that France would be able to exert significant influence over the new government 
through the electoral success of the Francophone parties (Van Trease, 1995a, p.43). 
When this did not occur, France sought to de-stabilise the new arrangements by 
tying aid to Vanuatu in exchange for constitutional reform (Arutangai, 1995, pp.59-
60), funding and supporting Opposition Francophone political parties (Ross, 1990, 
p.83), and encouraging dissent amongst the Francophone community.  Similarly, in 
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Fiji, there is evidence that the 1997 Constitution was intended by indigenous Fijian 
elites to provide a way for them “to maintain power through the promise of a new 
legitimization” (Premdas, 2002, p.22). Under the 1990 Constitution, divisions 
occurred amongst the indigenous Fijians political parties and these split parties 
battled to win majority power in Parliament and to pass budgets (Ratuva, 2016, 
p.24). The indigenous Fijian elite may therefore have created the new Constitution 
with the intention of consolidating their political power as, according to Lal and 
Hereniko (2002, pp.152-153), they “simply want a democracy that will always put 
[indigenous] Fijians…in power”. It is likely that the subsequent failure by an 
indigenous Fijian party to win the 1999 elections, against their expectations, was a 
contributing factor to the democratic instability that lead to the 2000 coup.  
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Conclusion 
 
This study assessed the impact of institutional arrangements on the democratic 
stability of the deeply divided states of Vanuatu and Fiji. The study found that the 
proportional representation electoral system of Vanuatu and its greater 
proportionality in the distribution of government resources resulted in greater 
democratic stability than the alternative approaches used in Fiji. The study also 
found that the presence of a power-sharing cabinet in Fiji negatively impacted on its 
democratic stability. Furthermore, the study found that disproportionality in the 
public sector, and attempts to re-balance this, contributed to instability in both states.  
 
This finding gives support to elements of Lijphart’s consociational theory, namely, 
the effectiveness of proportionality in the electoral system and in resource 
distribution. However, the findings do not support the use of a grand coalition (a 
power-sharing cabinet) as advocated by Lijphart. In this later respect, the findings 
lend evidence to the critiques of consociationalism which question the ability of 
elites to work cooperatively together. The study also provides evidence of the 
practical difficulties, tensions and instabilities that can arise in achieving 
proportionality in public sector appointments. Further research on this element of 
proportionality, and its relationship to affirmative action and indigenousness, may be 
useful.  
 
The paper also considered if institutional arrangements that are imposed on a state 
by external actors results in greater democratic instability. The findings from this 
paper do not support this hypothesis and contradict with empirical findings from 
other studies. Alternatively, the evidence suggests that instability may result in 
circumstances where the outcomes resulting from the institutional arrangements 
does not align with the expectations of those who were instrumental in their design. 
It may be worthwhile for future research to explore whether this finding has broader 
empirical support.  
 
It is important to recognise that there may be an alternative explanation for this 
second research finding: namely, the specific circumstances of Vanuatu. The 
institutional arrangements in Vanuatu gave the country its independence and 
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sovereignty and, consequently, political elites and the public may have given greater 
legitimacy to those arrangements. This includes respect for the rule of law and 
constitutional decisions made by the courts. Further research, however, will be 
required to confirm this explanation.  
 
Overall, this study illustrates the complexities involved in designing power-sharing 
institutional arrangements and in achieving democratic stability in deeply divided 
states.  
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